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A B S T R A C T
The state-of-the-art Cloud Computing (CC) has been commercially popular for shared resources of third party
applications. A cloud platform enables to share resources among mutually distrusting CC clients and oﬀers cost-
eﬀective, on-demand scaling. With the exponential growth of CC environment, vulnerabilities and their
corresponding exploitation of the prevailing cloud resources may potentially increase. Although CC provides
numerous beneﬁts to the cloud computing tenant. However, features namely resource sharing and Virtual
Machine (VM) physical co-residency raising the potential for sensitive information leakages such as Side
Channel (SC) attacks. In particular, the physical co-residency feature allows attackers to communicate with
another VM on the same physical machine and leak the conﬁdential information due to inadequate logical
isolation. Unlike encryption, which protects information from being decoded by unauthorized persons, SC
attacks aim to exploit the encryption systems and to hide the occurrence of communication. SC attacks were
initially identiﬁed as the main threat on multi-level secure systems i.e. OS, database, and networks. More
recently, the focus of the researchers has shifted toward SC attacks in CC. Since the last level cache (L2 or L3) is
always shared between VM, is the most targeting device for these attacks. Therefore, the aim of this article is to
explore cross-VM SC attacks involving the CPU cache and their countermeasures in CC and to compare with the
traditional SC attacks and countermeasures. We categorized the SC attacks according to the hardware medium
they target and exploit, the ways they access the module and the method they use to extract conﬁdential
information. We identiﬁed that traditional prevention mechanisms for SC attacks are not appropriate for
prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. We also proposed countermeasures for the prevention of these
attacks in order to improve security in CC.
1. Introduction
Cloud Computing (CC) is a new paradigm that acquires more
importance and brings unique features and vulnerabilities in today
Information Technology (IT) industry. Speciﬁcally, it introduces multi-
tenancy to facilitate the users to share computing physical resources
provisioned over the Internet and oﬀers cost-eﬀective, on-demand
scaling to the CC tenants. Although multi-tenancy provides numerous
beneﬁts to the CC tenants, this paradigm introduces a new concept
known as clients’ co-residence and Virtual Machine (VM) physical co-
residency. However, the security vulnerabilities arise from these well-
known concepts because it enables a new form of sensitive information
leakage. One of the security vulnerability to CC is the Side Channel (SC)
attacks. Co-residence clients and physical co-residency of VMs allow
the attacker's VM to communicate with the victim's VM running on the
same physical device that they should not by design, have access to
(Ristenpart et al., 2009). Since CC is not equivalent to physically
separated systems. Therefore, due to an inadequate logical isolation, it
facilitates the co-located malicious VM to use the SC attacks to leak
sensitive information about the victim VM functionality and exploit the
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